Three Days of Tape Review: Vietnam U23 Defense and the Void in Minutes 60-75

Three days of tape review, then a detail reveals itself. When the stands are empty, the pitch begins to tell the real story. I sat in the video review room at the Vietnam Football Federation (VFF) headquarters in Hanoi, rewinding the footage of the friendly match between Vietnam U23 and Palestine U23 played on August 12, 2026, at My Dinh Stadium. The match ended 1-1, but the scoreline was not my concern. I was counting every touch, every position, every movement of the defensive line. Numbers don't lie; they just wait for us to read them correctly. In Vietnam U23's last five matches, I noted a repeating pattern: between minutes 60 and 75, the home side's defensive line tends to drop five meters deeper than the match average, and the gap between the two centre-backs widens from 12 meters to 18 meters. Frequency is what spectators overlook, but coaches do not. This is not a new discovery in Southeast Asian football. But for a team preparing for the AFC U23 Asian Cup qualifiers in September 2026, correctly identifying the timing and cause of this decline could decide the ticket to the next round. The context of the August 12 match needs to be placed properly. Vietnam U23 entered the friendly with a squad featuring five overseas-based players, including centre-back Nguyễn Minh Trọng, who plays for Sint-Truiden in the Belgian Pro League. However, head coach Kim Sang-sik chose to keep Minh Trọng on the bench and used the domestic centre-back pairing of Lê Văn Đô and Trần Quốc Bảo. This decision shows the coaching staff is testing options in the absence of the key player — a realistic problem when qualifiers fall outside the FIFA window and European clubs are not obligated to release players. Data from Vietnam U23's last five matches paints a clear picture. In three matches against teams with fast transition play — Thailand U23, Iraq U23, and Palestine U23 — the home side's defense exposed large gaps between the two centre-backs between minutes 60 and 75. Specifically, in the match against Thailand U23 on July 20, 2026, the opponent created four clear chances during this period, and one of them led to the only goal of the match. In the match against Iraq U23 on August 5, 2026, Vietnam U23 conceded two goals at minutes 63 and 71 — both originating from the gap between the two centre-backs. I reviewed the footage of the Palestine U23 match at least eight times over three days. The tape is the witness. At minute 61, when Palestine U23 launched a counter-attack from their own half, the away side's central midfielder played a long diagonal pass into the space on the left side of the penalty area. Lê Văn Đô — the left centre-back — stepped up to the ball but stopped too quickly when he realized Trần Quốc Bảo was not keeping pace. The gap between the two widened to 22 meters, enough for the Palestinian striker to exploit. Fortunately, goalkeeper Đỗ Sỹ Huy rushed out to make the save. The repetition eight times cannot be coincidence. I counted before I dared to write. The cause of this phenomenon is not physical. GPS data from the training session on August 10 shows that the centre-backs' distance covered in 90-minute sessions does not significantly decline in the later stages. The problem lies in reading situations and coordination between the two centre-backs when facing transition pressure. Both Lê Văn Đô and Trần Quốc Bảo are capable of contesting in tight spaces, but they lack experience in handling situations when the team is stretched. I had the opportunity to speak with a coaching staff member after the August 11 training session, who requested anonymity. He admitted that the coaching staff has identified the problem but has not found a definitive solution. "We tried pulling the defensive midfielder deeper to provide support, but that reduces ball control in midfield," he said. "This is a balancing act." Football is not in a hurry; neither is the writer. But the AFC U23 Asian Cup qualifiers are approaching, and time is not on anyone's side. What is interesting is that this phenomenon did not appear in Vietnam U23 before June 2026. In the four previous matches — against Laos U23, Cambodia U23, Malaysia U23, and the Philippines U23 — the defensive line maintained a stable shape throughout 90 minutes. So what changed? The answer lies in the opponents. Laos U23, Cambodia U23, Malaysia U23, and the Philippines U23 are teams that tend to play slowly, dominate possession but rarely produce sudden transitions. Thailand U23, Iraq U23, and Palestine U23 all possess wingers with speeds exceeding 33 km/h — the speed threshold I identified in a previous article about the Vietnam national team's defense. When facing this speed, Vietnam U23's centre-backs tend to drop deeper to avoid being beaten, inadvertently creating space between them. I trust the tape because the tape has no emotions. In the Iraq U23 match, the second goal at minute 71 came from a situation where both Lê Văn Đô and Trần Quốc Bảo dropped toward the penalty area, leaving a 25-meter gap in front. The Iraqi midfielder received the ball in this space, unpressured, and executed a low shot into the far corner. Goalkeeper Đỗ Sỹ Huy could not reach it. Another detail I noted during tape review: at minute 65 of the Palestine U23 match, right-back Nguyễn Thành Long pushed forward to join the attack, and when the ball was lost, he did not recover his position in time. This forced Lê Văn Đô to shift right to cover, creating a large gap in the central channel. This is a systemic issue: the imbalance between lines when a full-back pushes high. In the silence of the pandemic, weaknesses reveal themselves. I recall 2026, when following Suwon Bluewings in Korea, I witnessed a similar phenomenon. When stadiums were empty due to the pandemic, the young players of that team showed fear of contact, leading them to move the ball wide instead of attacking through the middle. The lesson from Suwon Bluewings shows that tactical problems often have deeper psychological roots than what we see on the surface. For Vietnam U23, could it be that the centre-backs lack confidence when facing high-speed strikers? I do not have enough data to confirm this, but I can observe that in training sessions, Lê Văn Đô and Trần Quốc Bảo are frequently reminded by coach Kim Sang-sik to maintain the defensive line. "Don't drop too deep," I heard him say during the August 11 session. "Hold your position, don't panic." Coach Kim Sang-sik — who led South Korea at the 2026 World Cup — has a habit of using transition-based drills in training. I observed three Vietnam U23 training sessions this week, and I noticed that these drills focus primarily on improving the centre-backs' judgment in one-on-one situations. However, Vietnam U23's problem is not one-on-one ability, but coordination between the two centre-backs when stretched. Frequency is what spectators overlook, but coaches do not. In the last five matches, I recorded a total of 14 situations where the gap between the two centre-backs widened beyond 20 meters between minutes 60 and 75. Of these, 9 led to clear chances for the opponent, and 3 led to goals. This is an alarming rate. I want to compare with another team in the region: Thailand U23. In their last five matches, I recorded only 6 similar situations, and only 1 led to a goal. This difference is not about physicality or individual technique, but about how Thailand U23's two centre-backs — Chalermsak Aukkee and Songkhramsamut — coordinate under pressure. They tend to maintain a stable defensive line, do not drop too deep, and are willing to press opposing strikers from their own half. This is a lesson that Vietnam U23's coaching staff could reference. However, I do not believe copying Thailand U23's tactics wholesale is the solution. Each team has its own characteristics, and the key is finding a solution that fits the current squad. One viable solution is having the defensive midfielder drop deeper between minutes 60 and 75 to create a second defensive layer. Vietnam U23 has defensive midfielder Nguyễn Văn Trường — a player for Hanoi FC — with good reading of the game and a wide range of movement. However, pulling Nguyễn Văn Trường deeper would reduce ball control in midfield, and this could create new problems. Football is a game of balances. Every tactical adjustment has its price. I have reviewed the footage of the match between Vietnam U23 and Thailand U23 on July 20, 2026, at least 12 times. In this match, Vietnam U23's only goal conceded came at minute 68, and it originated from a situation almost identical to what I described above. Thailand U23's left-back — Anan Yodsangwal — received the ball in his own half and played a long diagonal pass into the space between Vietnam U23's two centre-backs. Striker Teerasak Poeiphimai controlled the ball, turned, and finished low into the far corner. Goalkeeper Đỗ Sỹ Huy attempted to save but the ball was too quick. What is notable is that this situation occurred at nearly the same time as the situations I observed in the Iraq U23 and Palestine U23 matches. Between minutes 60 and 75, Vietnam U23's defensive line tends to lose concentration, and opponents — regardless of who they are — recognize this weakness. I do not believe this is a physical issue. GPS data from training sessions shows that Vietnam U23 players are in good condition. The problem lies in concentration and reading situations under pressure. This is more of a psychological issue than a physical one. In a previous article about the Vietnam national team, I pointed out that the national team's defense tends to lose its bearings when facing strikers with speeds above 33 km/h. Data from Vietnam U23 shows a similar pattern, but with one difference: the problem only appears between minutes 60 and 75. This suggests that a specific psychological or tactical factor is at play during this period. I had the opportunity to speak with a Korean tactical analyst — who requested anonymity — about this phenomenon. He suggested this could be the result of players — albeit unconsciously — beginning to think about the match result during this period. "When the match enters minute 60, players start calculating what they need to do to preserve the result," he said. "This makes them more cautious, drop deeper, and inadvertently create space for the opponent." This is an interesting observation, and it aligns with what I observed on tape. In the situations I recorded, Vietnam U23's centre-backs tend to drop deeper than usual during this period, and they press opposing strikers less than in the opening minutes. So what is the solution? I do not have a definitive answer, but I can offer a few suggestions based on what I have observed. First, the coaching staff could use drills that simulate pressure situations between minutes 60 and 75. Instead of focusing only on one-on-one situations, they could create scenarios where the two centre-backs face pressure from multiple directions simultaneously. Second, having the defensive midfielder drop deeper during this period could be a temporary solution. However, this requires flexibility in adjusting the formation, and it could affect the team's attacking ability. Third, increasing communication between the two centre-backs is essential. In the situations I observed, Lê Văn Đô and Trần Quốc Bảo often do not communicate with each other when facing pressure. They act independently, and this creates a lack of synchronization in defense. I had the opportunity to observe a Vietnam U23 training session on August 11, and I noticed that coach Kim Sang-sik frequently reminds the centre-backs to maintain the defensive line. However, reminding them in training is not enough to create change in matches. Specific drills are needed to train the coordination between the two centre-backs in high-pressure situations. Football is not in a hurry; neither is the writer. But the AFC U23 Asian Cup qualifiers are approaching, and the Vietnam U23 coaching staff needs to find a solution in a short time. I want to emphasize that this is not a new problem. In modern football, teams struggling between minutes 60 and 75 is a common phenomenon. The five-substitution rule — introduced in 2026 — helps deeper squads, but it also turns the final 20 minutes into a war of attrition. Teams tend to increase pressure during this period, and this creates challenges for defenses. However, Vietnam U23's problem appears more severe than other teams in the region. The frequency of dangerous situations during this period is significantly higher, and this suggests this is not just a situational issue but a systemic one. I have reviewed the footage of the match between Vietnam U23 and Malaysia U23 on July 25, 2026. In this match, Vietnam U23 won 2-0, but I recorded 2 situations where the gap between the two centre-backs widened beyond 20 meters between minutes 60 and 75. Malaysia U23 — a team with a slow playing style — did not exploit these gaps, but a faster team would have. This is a warning for Vietnam U23's coaching staff. I want to offer a contrarian perspective: Vietnam U23's problem lies not in the defense, but in how the team controls the tempo of the match. When a team controls possession well, they do not need to defend. Conversely, when they lose the ball too easily, they face pressure from the opponent. In the matches against Thailand U23, Iraq U23, and Palestine U23, Vietnam U23 had lower possession rates than in other matches. This shows the team struggles to maintain possession when facing high press from opponents. And when they do not control the ball, they are forced to defend, and their defense exposes weaknesses. However, I do not believe the solution is to increase possession. Vietnam U23 does not have the squad strength to dominate high-speed opponents in the region. Instead, they need to learn to defend more effectively in pressed situations. I have reviewed the footage of the match between Vietnam U23 and Laos U23 on June 15, 2026. In this match, Vietnam U23 won 3-0, and their defense faced no significant pressure. However, I noted that between minutes 60 and 75, the centre-backs still tended to drop deeper than usual, even without pressure from the opponent. This suggests this could be a habit, not just a reaction to pressure. If this is a habit, changing it will require time and patience. However, time is not on Vietnam U23's side. I want to end this article with a question: is the Vietnam U23 coaching staff willing to take risks to test new solutions, or will they continue with the current cautious approach? The answer will be revealed in the AFC U23 Asian Cup qualifiers in September 2026. And I will be there, with my notebook and voice recorder, documenting every detail. The tape will be the witness, and the numbers will not lie.